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Analysis
Russian Energy Power Abroad
By Jeronim Perovic, Zurich 
Abstract
Energy lies at the heart of Russia’s economic recovery. Th e wealth generated from energy exports has gone 
hand in hand with political stabilization and has contributed signiﬁ cantly to Russia’s assertiveness in inter-
national politics. Energy has emerged as a key factor shaping Russian’s foreign relations. But it is diﬃ  cult for 
Russia to use energy as leverage in a market where buyers, sellers, and intermediaries are so inter-connected. 
Th e interdependencies in the energy market are complex, and changes in the system can easily lead to con-
ﬂ icts that might ultimately also aﬀ ect Russia in a negative way. Russia thus has to maneuver carefully in its 
decision-making, since the stability of the system also depends on the choices that the EU, Russia’s neigh-
bors, and the US make. 
Russia’s Role for Eurasian Energy Flows
As a major supplier of fossil fuel, Russia plays an impor-
tant role for global energy security. According to the 
most recent European Commission ﬁ gures, 27 percent 
of the oil and 24 percent of the gas consumed in the EU 
are of Russian origin. Of EU imports, 30 percent of its 
oil and 44 percent of its gas come from Russia. Some of 
Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, 
Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) as well as other non-
EU states (especially the western Balkan countries and 
Turkey) are likewise dependent on Russian energy. 
Russia also represents the most important chan-
nel for Eurasian energy ﬂ ows. Th e country is the main 
export outlet for Central Asian gas and oil and the 
most important consumer of gas from Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Recent developments 
have only had a small impact on this picture. Some of 
the Caspian oil and gas exports sent westwards now 
circumvent Russian territory via newly constructed 
pipelines from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. 
Small amounts of Turkmen gas ﬂ ow to Iran by pipe-
line, and some of Kazakhstan’s oil is shipped to China 
via a new pipeline. 
Furthermore, Russia is seeking to become a key 
player on the Asian oil and gas markets. While the 
Sakhalin ﬁ elds already provide some energy to coun-
tries in the Asian-Paciﬁ c region, plans are underway to 
explore and develop East Siberian oil and gas ﬁ elds and 
to build a network of oil and gas pipelines connecting 
this region to Asian consumers. 
Concerns about Russia 
Russia has received bad press for its foreign energy pol-
icy. Th e price dispute between Gazprom and Ukraine, 
for instance, which ultimately prompted Russia to cut 
oﬀ  gas deliveries to Ukraine in January 2006, has some-
times been portrayed in Western media as a politically-
motivated action and “punishment” from the Kremlin 
for the country’s “Orange Revolution” of 2004. Th e 
construction of a pipeline from Russia to Germany un-
der the Baltic Sea and the penetration of the European 
energy market by Gazprom and other Russian energy 
companies are often seen as part of a “divide and con-
quer” policy aimed at undermining eﬀ orts by European 
Union members to pursue a common European ener-
gy policy. Russia’s declared goal of entering the Asian 
energy market is frequently depicted as an attempt to 
play oﬀ  East against West.
Russians argue that their actions are driven purely 
by business interests as they seek to secure the highest 
possible return for their energy sales. While Russian 
motivations remain a matter of contention, many are 
beginning to fear that Russia is simply not investing 
enough in its production capacity to provide suﬃ  cient 
oil and gas to meet growing European demand while 
satisfying new Asian customers. Russia’s ability to meet 
future world demand is becoming a question of increas-
ing anxiety. Russian companies have been increasing 
their investment in upstream projects recently, but the 
question ultimately remains whether new ﬁ elds will 
come online before existing production falls to a point 
where Russia will not be able to meet the projected 
output increase (see also Indra Øverland’s article in 
this issue).
Nevertheless, Russia certainly has every interest in 
keeping a strong proﬁ le as an energy supplier to interna-
tional markets. Th e energy sector is the motor of Russia’s 
economic growth and the massive rents generated from 
oil and gas sales are highly important for Russia’s state 
revenues. In 2006, the Russian budget received close 
to $50 billion from oil export duties. Almost half of 
Russia’s total export earnings are oil-related.
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Russian-European Energy Relations
Europe is by far Russia’s most important trading part-
ner. Given the very strong mutual dependencies be-
tween Russia and Europe, it is at present hard to imag-
ine that either side would see a beneﬁ t in applying sanc-
tions against the other. Around two-thirds of Russian 
gas and oil exports go to EU member states, while the 
rest is sold to other European countries and the CIS 
states. According to European Commission ﬁ gures, in 
2005, the EU accounted for some 56 percent of Russia’s 
exports and around 45 percent of its imports. In such 
numerical terms, the signiﬁ cance of Russia for Europe 
is relatively small. Russia is certainly important as a sup-
plier of oil and gas to Europe, but its role is also con-
ﬁ ned to these two commodities. Overall, in 2005, the 
country accounted for only about 10 percent of EU 
overall imports and consumed a little more than 6 per-
cent of EU exports. 
Although in terms of overall trade volumes, Russia 
is clearly much more dependent on Europe than vice 
versa, it is the quality of the dependency that makes 
Russia equally important to Europe. Oil and gas are 
commodities of the highest strategic importance, and 
Europe at present cannot do without Russian supplies. 
A hypothetical stop of Russian oil deliveries would hurt 
Europe less than a disruption of gas supplies, however, 
simply because all of the gas that Europe imports from 
Russia arrives through pipelines and there are currently 
no alternative sources. Th e physical connection between 
consumers and producers is less immediate in the case 
of oil, where most imports arrive by tanker, and where 
shortfalls could theoretically be balanced via imports 
from other places. 
Europe could gain leverage in dealing with Russia 
if the members of the EU decided to speak with one 
voice towards Russia. As long as European countries 
prefer to deal with Russia on the basis of individual bi-
lateral relations, the EU cannot bring the full poten-
tial of its leverage to bear. Th is is why the EU has so 
far failed to achieve reciprocity in its energy relations. 
While Russian companies are allowed to enter the EU 
downstream market, EU and foreign companies still 
face obstacles when seeking similar access in Russia. 
Th e state-controlled Gazprom monopoly controls 85 
percent of gas production and all major gas pipelines 
and the state monopoly Transneft operates Russia’s oil 
transportation system. 
Th e EU has made a series of eﬀ orts to increase the 
pressure on Russia, for instance by a EU Commission 
proposal in summer 2007 that aims to break up big util-
ities that control power supply, generation, and trans-
mission. While this planned legislation is directed at 
some of Europe’s own big energy utilities, it would also 
eﬀ ectively bar foreign companies such as Gazprom from 
controlling European networks unless they play by the 
same rules as EU companies and their home country 
has an agreement with Brussels. While this plan faces 
opposition from within the EU itself, Russia has also 
reacted angrily, and it still very uncertain whether this 
plan will be implemented in the near future. For the 
time being, however, the disputes in European-Russian 
relations are not reﬂ ected at the general level of busi-
ness cooperation or in day-to-day politics. 
Energy Dependencies between Russia and 
its Post-Soviet Neighbors
Energy is also a major element in Russia’s relations with 
its post-Soviet neighbors. Russia is important for the re-
gion in two ways: as a customer and transit country for 
Central Asian gas and oil, and as a supplier of oil, gas, 
and electricity to energy-poor countries like Georgia, 
Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. 
But Russia is also dependent on some of these states. 
Russia relies on Central Asian gas imports in order to 
oﬀ set declining production from its own major ﬁ elds 
in Western Siberia. Ukraine and Belarus are important 
as transit countries for Russian gas and oil to Europe: 
About 80 percent of Russia’s gas destined for Europe 
transits Ukraine. Russia’s biggest oil pipeline, Druzhba, 
which accounts for about one third of Russia’s crude ex-
ports to Europe, crosses Belarus. Even after the new oil 
and gas pipelines circumventing Ukraine and Belarus 
become operational, the bulk of Russian gas, and a 
signiﬁ cant share of Russian pipeline oil, will still pass 
through these two countries.
Th ere have been two notable changes in Russia’s ap-
proach towards its former Soviet neighbors in recent 
years: A ﬁ rst change is that Russia has stopped its poli-
cy of subsidizing other economies with cheap gas. Th us, 
from about 2005–2006 onwards, it started to raise pric-
es to world market levels. It has occasionally done so 
in very bad style by abruptly shutting down energy 
supplies. But, even if Russia’s price hikes should cause 
more friction in the years to come, this development 
would still be a healthy one, as it would end the subsi-
dies to these economies of cheap Russian energy and 
would eventually help to stabilize relations between 
Russia and its neighbors based on market principles. In 
fact, Russia has been raising prices for its adversaries 
(e.g., Georgia) and allies (e.g., Belarus) alike, although 
at varying speeds. In some instances, Russia has even 
accepted that the price increase will result in a loss of 
inﬂ uence. For example, Georgia, which until recent-
ly imported all of its gas from Russia, is increasing-
ly turning to Azerbaijan and Iran as alternative sourc-
es for its imports. Azerbaijan has stopped importing 
Russian gas altogether and has tapped into its own do-
mestic sources. 
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A second change has occurred in the way Russia 
handles the Central Asian gas producers. Russia is still 
the major outlet for the gas (and oil) extracted in the 
region, but given the competition from the EU, the 
US, and China for Central Asian energy, Russia has 
decided to become a more attractive customer by of-
fering higher prices. While Turkmenistan sold its gas 
to Russia for $44 per thousand cubic meters of gas in 
2005 (with only half of it paid in cash), the price was 
$100 in 2007. In the meantime, the two sides have 
agreed to raise the price to $150 by July–December 
2008. Russia is also paying much higher prices for gas 
purchased from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
In addition to price increases, Russia has also oﬀ ered 
the Caspian states the opportunity to expand their di-
rect outlets to the lucrative Western European market 
by using its transportation system. In December 2007, 
for example, Russia ﬁ nally agreed to expand the ca-
pacity of the pipeline operated by the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium, which transports mainly Kazakhstan’s 
oil westwards. Moscow decided to expand the capaci-
ty after Kazakhstan consented to ship oil through the 
planned Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, a trans-
Balkan pipeline designed to take Russian and Central 
Asian oil from Bulgaria to Greece. 
In the case of Caspian gas, Europe is now compet-
ing with China for supplies. Currently, Russia buys up 
Central Asian gas and uses it to supply its own domes-
tic market and the markets of Ukraine and other CIS 
states, thus freeing Russian gas for export to Europe at 
a higher price than Russia paid for it in Central Asia. 
Should China manage to divert substantial parts of 
Central Asia’s gas eastwards, however, the balance be-
tween the CIS and Russia will suﬀ er, thus potentially 
leaving less gas for Europe. While both Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan have already concluded agreements 
with China on gas supply via new pipelines, Kazakhstan 
is also contemplating the construction of a gas pipeline 
eastward along the route of the existing oil pipeline. 
Russian-Asian Energy Relations
Th e concern that Russia might divert increasing vol-
umes of already scarce energy to Asia, mostly to China, 
thus leaving less for Europe, is a distorted view inso-
far as it leaves a key element of Russia’s Asia strategy 
out of the picture: namely, that Russia intends to de-
velop new ﬁ elds in East Siberia and the Far East for 
the purpose of making additional oil and gas available 
for the Asian market (see also Nina Poussenkova’s ar-
ticle in this issue). 
However, Russia’s diversiﬁ cation eﬀ orts towards 
Asia are not going as smoothly as planned. Apart from 
the Sakhalin oil and gas projects, other major projects 
– like the Kovytka gas ﬁ eld in Eastern Siberia – are 
still in the early stage of development. If the ﬁ elds of 
Eastern Siberia are to be developed, the building of an 
extensive pipeline infrastructure to East Asia is of par-
amount importance. Th is, however, has also proved to 
be more complicated than anticipated. Negotiations 
with Japan and China have been going on since the 
early 1990s, but it is still uncertain when the pipelines 
will be built and become operational. Even the routes 
are still under discussion.
Th ere are multiple reasons for Russia’s failure to 
make much progress on the Asian energy front. In the 
area of gas, a major obstacle is certainly that Russia and 
China have not yet been able to agree on a price that will 
guarantee that Russia’s large planned up-front invest-
ments will pay oﬀ  within a foreseeable time span. Yet an-
other, potentially more important issue is that Russia’s 
policy towards China still seems to suﬀ er from a psycho-
logical blockade fueled by decades of mutual mistrust. 
Russia understands that it has to engage with China for 
economic reasons, but it feels uneasy providing the fuel 
for China’s modernization, which will inevitably accel-
erate the rise of a neighbor that could, from the Russian 
point of view, not only surpass Russia economically, but 
also pose a military threat in the future. 
Even if pipelines are constructed that tie Asia to the 
ﬁ elds in Western Siberia (a region that has traditional-
ly supplied the European market), the key issue would 
likely not be politics, but the price that Russia’s cus-
tomers in West and East are ready to pay. As of now, 
Europe remains by far the most lucrative market for 
Russian gas and oil, and the most important source for 
generating Russian export revenues. Under normal po-
litical and economic circumstances, Russia is unlike-
ly to redirect gas destined for its traditional costumers 
in Europe to Asia unless it can achieve similar or bet-
ter conditions.
Contrary to what is often written in the Western 
media, the main point for Russia is not to balance 
Europe against Asia, but to establish a diversity of cus-
tomers among the individual Asian countries (mainly 
China and Japan) and, in the case of Sakhalin, among 
Asia and the US. Russia seeks a diversity to reduce its 
dependence on any particular customer.
Energy and Russia’s Future
Th e international markets are dependent on Russian 
energy, but Russia is also dependent on these markets. 
Th e real worry for Europe and Russia’s neighbors is not 
so much with regard to Russia’s foreign energy poli-
cy, but the role that energy plays for Russian domes-
tic trajectories. 
Energy has provided the fuel for Russia’s economic 
growth and has helped to stabilize Russia after the po-
litical chaos and economic turmoil of the 1990s. But 
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this stabilization has come at the expense of democra-
cy and uneven economic development in favor of the 
raw materials’ sector. Th e massive new wealth from oil 
and gas sales has also helped spur an increase in cor-
ruption and authoritarian tendencies. Russia’s stability 
is very much linked to the ability of the ruling elite to 
redistribute rents in a way so as to accommodate the 
various conﬂ icting interests in Russian society. At least 
indirectly, Russia’s stability is thus tied to a well-func-
tioning domestic and international energy market and 
stable prices. It also depends on Russia’s ability to con-
tinue playing a signiﬁ cant role as a supplier of energy 
to international markets. Major disruptions would ul-
timately test Russia’s precarious political stability. 
Th e challenge for Russia’s new president will be to 
manage Russia’s energy wealth in the way that is best 
for the country’s long-term political, economic, and so-
cial development. Such eﬀ orts can best succeed if Russia 
manages to develop a thriving liberal market that is at 
least to some extent dependent on an open society. 
About the author:
Jeronim Perovic is the co-editor of the Russian Analytical Digest and a senior researcher at the Center for Security 
Studies, ETH Zurich.
Analysis
Russia’s New Political Leadership and its Implication for East Siberian 
Development and Energy Cooperation with North East Asian States
By Yoshinori Takeda, Moscow
Abstract
Th e transition from Putin to Medvedev marks an important new beginning for the future of East Siberian 
energy resources and their impact on Russia’s Asian neighbors. East Siberian resources have not been de-
veloped, but could have great impact on Russia’s relations with Asia. China currently has the best relations 
with Russia, while Japan has made little progress, and Korea has secured one major deal. Th e Korean ar-
rangements with Russia could serve as a model for future ties because they strongly favor the Russian side, 
which maintains a 60 percent share of the project while taking on little risk. In the future, Russia’s energy 
decisions will continue to have strong political motivations, but they will be based on better deﬁ ned rules 
of the game. Essentially, Russia will use its energy resources to develop the Russian state and only allow for-
eign companies to participate in projects that meet Russia’s national interest.
From Putin to Medvedev
Th e process of political and economic modernization 
in Russia entered a new phase on December 10, 2007, 
when President Vladimir Putin chose First Deputy 
Prime-Minister Dmitri Medvedev as Russia’s next pres-
ident. Medvedev’s nomination clearly demonstrates that 
over the next four years Russia will seek further eco-
nomic growth and the social welfare beneﬁ ts that de-
rive from such growth. Medvedev has been a close ally 
of Putin’s for the last decade, but he is not a former se-
cret service oﬃ  cer. In addition, Medvedev is less hawk-
ish than others surrounding Putin. 
Meanwhile, the Russian government is moving ex-
tremely slowly in diversifying the economy, a move seen 
as necessary to ensure continuing economic prosperi-
ty regardless of the cost of raw materials. Since almost 
70 percent of Russia’s budget revenues and export val-
ue derive from primary commodities, Medvedev will 
have to take serious measures towards economic diver-
siﬁ cation while Russia remains dependent upon oil and 
gas. Against a backdrop of historically high oil prices, 
this economic course would help Russia pursue its geo-
political strategy in the foreseeable future and lead the 
nation to a position of global inﬂ uence and power with 
its oil and gas reserves.
Among Russia’s oil deposits, East Siberia is the most 
underdeveloped region. In 2006, its total crude oil pro-
duction amounted to only 0.7 million tons, or 0.1 per-
cent of the national total. Although East Siberia’s oil 
reserve is estimated to be approximately 75 billion bar-
rels (10.2 billion tons), proven crude amounts are only 
7 billion barrels. In addition, exploration has barely be-
gun beyond two ﬁ elds – the Verkhnechon ﬁ eld in the 
Irkutsk region and the Talakan ﬁ eld in the Sakha re-
6analytical
digest
russian
russian analytical digest  33/08
public. Even Putin, who has shown intense interest in 
the economic and social development of East Siberia 
and the Far East by funding a federal program for the 
region’s growth with $24 billion from the state budget 
in 2007, has done little to spur a search for crude oil 
in East Siberia. For Medvedev, encouraging exploita-
tion of new ﬁ elds may be key to averting an expected 
future drop in Russia’s oil output. It may also provide 
important leverage vis-à-vis Asian countries, especial-
ly China, Japan and South Korea.
Russian-Asian Energy Relations: Current 
Circumstances
Th roughout the second term of Putin’s presidency, 
China has been undoubtedly the front-runner in ener-
gy cooperation with Russia. A major milestone of Sino-
Russia energy relations was the $6 billion loan from 
the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
to Russia’s highest-producing state-owned oil company, 
Rosneft, in early 2005. Th is ﬁ nancial resource made it 
possible for Rosneft to purchase Yuganskneftegaz, the 
main subsidiary of the former Yukos, at a state-run auc-
tion. 2005–2006 saw a series of important deals be-
tween Moscow and Beijing: Rosneft and CNPC formed 
a joint venture for upstream projects in East Siberia; 
CNPC and Transneft, Russia’s state-owned oil pipe-
line monopoly, agreed to build a Chinese branch of the 
East Siberia – Paciﬁ c Ocean oil pipeline project (ESPO) 
funded with Chinese money; and CNPC and Gazprom, 
the world’s No. 1 gas company, proposed an ambitious 
plan to build two huge gas pipelines to China by 2011. 
Th ese projects are, however, being very slowly devel-
oped. While Vostok Energy, the joint company estab-
lished by Rosneft and CNPC, won two small oil and 
gas wells in East Siberia at an auction for $45 million, 
the spur of the ESPO has not yet reached the Sino-
Russian border, and the gas pipeline projects are on 
the verge of collapse.
Japanese-Russian energy talks have been held 
around the ESPO project (a pipeline originating in 
East Siberia in Taishet, Irkutsk region, and extending 
to a Paciﬁ c port at Kozmino bay, in the Primorsk re-
gion). Regarding this colossal venture, Japan took the 
position that pipeline economics was not an issue since 
governments (Russia, Japan and other countries con-
cerned) could provide long-term credits, tax exemp-
tions and subsidies to lower the pipeline’s cost. Th is 
perspective led Tokyo to raise two points at the ne-
gotiating table: exploring reserves in East Siberia and 
funding for feasibility studies and the construction it-
self. However, no real progress in Japanese-Russian co-
operation in ESPO construction, including upstream 
projects in East Siberia, has been reported so far. In the 
meantime, Japanese companies have begun to show in-
terest in other spheres of energy relations, like partici-
pating in Gazprom’s projects and Rosneft’s downstream 
business (such as oil reﬁ neries).
Th e South Korean economy is not as large as that 
of China or Japan and, consequently, its energy coop-
eration with Russia is not substantial, so far. Still, the 
South Korean national oil company (Korean National 
Oil Corporation, KNOC) and Rosneft have made one 
impressive agreement to develop the West Kamchatka 
shelf that is estimated to hold about 900 million tons 
of oil equivalents at 26 sites. Th is deal will become a 
good model for Asian countries aiming at pragmatic 
energy cooperation with Russian state-owned oil com-
panies for two reasons. First, KNOC could successfully 
avoid the strategic ﬁ elds issue. While the Kremlin’s def-
inition of the phrase “strategic ﬁ eld” is not clear and is 
mostly subjective, one thing is beyond doubt: the par-
ticipation of foreign companies in projects at strategic 
deposits is highly politicized and strictly limited. West 
Kamchatka, however, is apparently not a strategic ﬁ eld 
for Moscow due to its geographical location (11,000 ki-
lometers, or 6,900 miles from Moscow) and the volume 
of its deposit. Second, the Koreans have agreed to two 
key conditions and thus could satisfy Rosneft. Th e ﬁ rst 
condition is a 60–40 share division, i.e. Rosneft holds a 
60 percent share of this project. Th is number is impor-
tant for Rosneft, which wants to promote projects with 
foreigners from a superior position. Th e other condition 
is that the Korean company will invest in prospecting 
operations, taking on 100 percent of the risk in explo-
ration, and Rosneft will be able to claim a share of the 
revenues once commercial production begins.
After 2008: a New Hope for Foreigners, 
including Russia’s Asian Neighbors
Th e slow development of Russian energy cooperation 
mentioned above has been a problem, not only for Asian 
countries, but for the U.S. and European partners, as 
well. Political uncertainties in 2007, due mainly to the 
lack of clarity about Putin’s successor, and the lack of 
clear rules of the game in Russia’s energy policy delayed 
many projects, while Russia’s federal budget enjoyed ex-
tra revenues thanks to record-high oil prices. 
Perhaps 2008 will see a change in such circumstanc-
es. Medvedev’s presidency will bring some new elements 
into Russia’s energy policy, including its relations with 
East Siberia. In attempting to read the future of East 
Siberia and its implications for Asian countries, it is 
worth paying attention to two points: political motiva-
tion and the formation of the rules of the game.
Political Motivation
Undoubtedly, Moscow can now eﬀ ectively use its ener-
gy resources as tools of geopolitical strategy; i.e. most of 
7analytical
digest
russian
russian analytical digest  33/08
the Kremlin’s decisions on energy issues are political-
ly motivated. Since 2000, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin has strongly driven foreign and domestic pol-
icy under the slogan of a “strong and self-conﬁ dent 
Russia.” During the eight years of his presidency, the 
world’s macroeconomic climate, including exceedingly 
high-priced fossil fuels, allowed Russia to consolidate 
its role in global politics and markets, especially in the 
energy ﬁ eld. In spite of criticism from the West towards 
Moscow’s energy leverage, we see no setback to Russia’s 
geopolitical strategy using its rich energy resources. On 
the contrary, Russia is coming to a position of global in-
ﬂ uence and power with its oil and gas reserves.
Political incentive plays all the more vital a role in 
the development of East Siberia because, without special 
arrangements by the government, it is almost impossi-
ble, even for ineﬃ  cient Russian state-owned companies, 
to tap new resources that sit under one of the world’s 
most forbidding terrains. Tax holidays of up to ten years 
for companies developing oil deposits in East Siberia in-
troduced by the Russian government in 2006 are a case 
in point. Th en Minister of Economic Development and 
Trade German Gref explained the reason for this move, 
saying that the tax holiday decision and the ESPO proj-
ect would help increase oil production in East Siberia. 
Moreover, the Kremlin has a strong political motive to 
utilize Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz, fourth in oil out-
put among Russia’s oil companies and totally loyal to 
Putin, as tools of East Siberian development. In May 
2007, Surgutneftegaz’s CEO Vladimir Bogndanov, an-
nounced that the company’s future production in West 
Siberia would be ﬂ at, with all its output growth likely 
to come from East Siberia.
Th is political motivation will certainly lead the 
Siberian pipeline to the Paciﬁ c Ocean, despite uncer-
tainty over the oil reserves and the proﬁ tability of this 
pipeline. 2007 saw some negative elements in the con-
struction of the ESPO: a serious delay in the ESPO’s 
ﬁ rst stage construction (up to Skovorodino, a town in 
the Irkutsk region near the Sino-Russian border) and 
the postponement of the start of the ESPO’s second 
stage construction (to Kozmino bay). However, one 
should take into account the fact that the ESPO is 
Putin’s project. His involvement practically assures the 
completion of this gigantic project, despite the many 
negative observations uttered by oﬃ  cials and special-
ists. A scenario in which the pipeline is not built can 
be excluded. 
Th e Rules of the Game
Th e formation of the rules of the game in Russia’s ener-
gy policy is another decisive factor that could encour-
age fundamental progress in energy-related business. 
Actually, throughout the eight years of Putin’s presiden-
cy, especially after the Yukos aﬀ air in 2003, unwritten 
rules have been formulated. Th e essential one is simple: 
Russia has enormous natural resources and should uti-
lize them eﬀ ectively to attain the social and economic 
development of the state. Two more fundamental un-
written rules can be added: ﬁ rst, the state must con-
trol the export of its resources; second, foreign inves-
tors are welcome only when they are ready to partici-
pate in projects that answer principally to Russia’s na-
tional interests.
Now, Moscow is moving to the formation of clear 
rules, particularly with the adoption of a new version 
of the subsoil law. For most of Putin’s presidency there 
has been a heated discussion on the bill amending the 
existing subsoil law. Th e crucial issue over the proposed 
amendment is the extent of foreign companies’ access 
to Russian deposits. Until quite recently, the draft com-
pletely prevented foreigners from working strategic de-
posits, which undoubtedly means all large promising oil 
and gas ﬁ elds and whose ultimate deﬁ nition will depend 
on the Kremlin’s subjective decisions. After the nomi-
nation of Medvedev, a new move appeared: Minister of 
Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev stated that his minis-
try would make a change in the bill and that all issues, 
including foreigners’ participation in strategic depos-
its and foreigners’ access will be discussed by a govern-
ment committee.
Who Wins?
Th e idea of establishing a government committee will 
not increase the transparency of the decision-making 
process, which is an essential element of corporate gov-
ernance in the West, but will only add to the existing 
impression of decision-making behind closed doors. 
Th e important point is, however, that the Russian gov-
ernment has expressed its intention to form rules of the 
game in energy policy. After the long-term twists and 
turns in the amendments to the subsoil law, the bill 
will be approved by the newly formed State Duma in 
the near future, perhaps under Medvedev’s presidency. 
Now, it is clear that political motivation and rules of 
the game matter for everyone who wants to proﬁ t from 
Russia’s natural resources.
As discussed above, these two factors are decisive 
for East Siberian development since it requires strong 
political will and enormous funding. Among poten-
tial foreign partners, China is already two-three steps 
ahead since Beijing understands well the importance 
of the political incentive and has successfully formed 
a strategic partnership relationship with Moscow in 
recent years. Moreover, China and India, which buy 
Russia’s military weapons and satisfy Moscow with the 
formation of a trilateral grouping against U.S. unilat-
eral hegemony, enjoy the advantages of barter trade 
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with Russia and are ready to join upstream projects in 
East Siberia. However, Japan, South Korea, and even 
the United States and European countries are not too 
late for this race. Th e winner will be the one that un-
derstands Moscow’s rules of the game and can utilize 
Russia’s political motivation and its own capital. 
About the author:
Yoshinori Takeda is a Japanese diplomat in Moscow. Th is paper represents the author’s personal views and should not 
be construed as reﬂ ecting the position of the government of Japan.
Analysis
Shtokman and Russia’s Arctic Petroleum Frontier
By Indra Øverland, Oslo
Abstract
Th e need to develop new sources of natural gas to supply domestic and foreign customers is pushing 
Gazprom into the Arctic. Two key Arctic projects could, at least in theory, become the company’s and 
the country’s new mainstays: Shtokman and Yamal. Th e realistic time-scales, cost frames and sources 
of ﬁ nancing for these two projects remain highly unclear. It is also unclear whether the projects will be 
developed in parallel or sequentially. So far, however, there has been far more organizational stir sur-
rounding the Shtokman ﬁ eld, which is therefore the main topic of this article. Th e Shtokman ﬁ eld is 
located close to the Norwegian border in the Barents Sea, and the Norwegian oil major StatoilHydro 
has been selected as one of the two main foreign partners for the project. Th e development of the proj-
ect therefore has implications for Russian–Norwegian relations in the north, which are also discussed 
in this paper.
Russian Gas Production and the Eurasian 
Energy Balance
Events in Ukraine in January 2006 and Belarus in 
January 2007 fuelled worries in some circles about 
Russia’s reliability as a supplier to European mar-
kets. More recently, concerns have shifted to whether 
Russia will be able to supply its customers, even if it 
wants to. Th e supply crunch is envisaged as occurring 
sometime between 2010 and 2012. Th ese fears revolve 
around Western Siberia’s Nadym Pur Taz Region and 
its three super-giant ﬁ elds: Medvezhe, Urengoy and 
Yamburg. Over 90 percent of Russia’s natural gas is 
extracted in Nadym Pur Taz, but production in the 
region is falling fast. Th e ﬁ elds have all been produc-
ing for over 20 years (37 in the case of Medvezhe), 
and injection techniques applied during the Soviet 
period to boost output have shortened their life span 
and steepened the production decline. At the same 
time, Russia’s economy is expanding and natural gas 
remains heavily under-priced. As a consequence, do-
mestic consumption is increasing. Foreign customers 
and Russian pundits are left wondering where the gas 
is going to come from in the future, and the simplest 
answer is Shtokman and or Yamal.
Th e Russian Arctic and World Energy 
Supplies
In a widely cited survey, the US Geological Survey es-
timated that up to 25 percent of the world’s undiscov-
ered oil and gas may be located in the Arctic. What is 
less often noted is that a large part of these resourc-
es are located in the Russian part of the Arctic. Th is 
is not just because almost half of the Arctic littoral 
is Russian, but also because the seabed along Russia’s 
Arctic coast includes some of the biggest ﬁ nds ever in 
the Arctic, some of the most promising areas, and some 
of the least explored areas. Th us, Shtokman and Yamal 
are the gateways to an Arctic Russian adventure that 
could satisfy a substantial part of the world’s future oil 
and gas demand.
Shtokman versus Yamal 
Shtokman is located in North-Western Russia, close to 
the Nordic countries. Yamal is located further east in 
the Asian part of Russia. Choosing between the two 
projects therefore has implications not only for Russia’s 
internal economic geography, but also for the proxim-
ity and linkages to the Nordic countries, the EU and 
overseas markets (for LNG).
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A commonplace perception of the Russian natural 
gas industry is that it is relatively well-equipped to build 
pipelines and carry out other operations onshore, its 
main tasks during the Soviet period. It is also thought 
that, whether the Russian actors admit it or not, the 
industry is woefully inexperienced and incompetent 
when it comes to oﬀ shore operations. Th is shortcom-
ing has occasionally been cited as a reason why Russian 
industrial actors would prefer Yamal to be given prior-
ity over Shtokman.
In a seminal article from 2006 on Russia’s Arctic 
petroleum sector, Arild Moe casts the choice between 
Shtokman and Yamal as battle between diﬀ erent groups 
within Russia’s petroleum sector and within Gazprom. 
At the time, it appeared that the West Siberian lobby 
had won in pushing for Yamal and that it was unlike-
ly any Western companies would be invited to partici-
pate in the project at all. Shtokman’s current advantage 
over Yamal, however tenuous, probably does not indi-
cate that the Western Siberian lobby has ﬁ nally been 
defeated, nor does it reﬂ ect a particular urge to coop-
erate with Western countries. Rather, it could be an 
implicit recognition that it is better to go for a project 
where the capital, technology, and (not least) organi-
zational skills of Western companies can play a central 
role. Bringing in Western partners may help the proj-
ect move forward, and if it does not, there will be more 
companies to share the blame.
Yamal
Th e Yamal Peninsula, along with the Kara Sea, into 
which the peninsula juts, likely holds over 30 trillion 
cubic meters of gas, enough to supply the whole world 
for a decade. Like Shtokman, however, Yamal involves 
daunting challenges. Railways and proper roads are 
non-existent. Melting and refreezing of the ground 
on the peninsula pose even more daunting challeng-
es, since these changes may literally undermine trans-
port infrastructure, gas extraction and treatment fa-
cilities, and living quarters built for workers. Any on-
Source: http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article21712.shtml
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shore gas extraction would infringe on the large-scale 
reindeer herding operations of the indigenous peoples 
of the region. Finally, the cost of fully developing the 
Yamal ﬁ elds would be on the order of hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars and could take up to 50 years.
On the other hand, Yamal is relatively convenient-
ly located in relation to Russia’s existing pipelines from 
Nadym Pur Taz to its domestic and foreign markets. 
Th e accelerated ice melting currently observed in the 
Arctic Ocean, which far outpaces the estimates of the 
relatively conservative International Panel on Climate 
Change, also opens interesting opportunities for LNG/
marine transportation and for the oﬀ shore ﬁ elds.
While Yamal is bigger and in many ways more at-
tractive to Russian actors than Shtokman, it is the lat-
ter that seems to be progressing fastest at the moment – 
however unpredictable that progress is. Th e rest of this 
article therefore focuses on Shtokman. 
Shtokman
Th e Shtokman gas and condensate ﬁ eld is the largest oﬀ -
shore gas ﬁ eld in the world. It was discovered in 1988 
and was recently re-estimated by Gazprom to contain 
3.8 trillion cubic meters of gas and 31 million tons of 
condensate (previous estimates had usually been on 
the order of 3.2 trillion cubic meters of gas). It is locat-
ed 555 km north of the Kola Peninsula, in the Russian 
part of the Barents Sea. Although smaller than Yamal, 
Shtokman contains more than twice as much natural 
gas as Canada’s total known reserves.
For several years after they were included in 
a Gazprom shortlist, the oil companies Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, Hydro, Statoil and Total vied to ac-
quire ownership stakes in the Shtokman ﬁ eld. In 
Norway, where the project has received a lot of atten-
tion, the result was a rollercoaster of rising expectations 
and subsequent disappointment as uncoordinated state-
ments and accidental signals from the Russian side fu-
elled rumors and media speculation on the Norwegian 
side that a decision was imminent, or that one or both 
of the Norwegian companies might be awarded a sig-
niﬁ cant stake, or that the game was over and no for-
eign companies would be included. In their endeavor 
to join the project, the two Norwegian companies had 
extensive support from the Norwegian government and 
diplomatic apparatus. 
In July 2007 it was announced that the French oil 
company Total had been awarded a 25 percent stake in 
the joint company that is to develop the ﬁ rst phase of 
Shtokman. It had long been clear that Gazprom would 
retain 51 percent ownership, so the ﬁ nal competition 
for the remaining 24 percent was between StatoilHydro 
and ChevronTexaco. To some extent this was a compe-
tition between Norwegian technology and good-neigh-
borly relations in the North on the one hand, and US 
markets and big-power partnership on the other hand. 
StatoilHydro won the last 24 percent of the ﬁ eld on 
24 October 2007.
It is important to understand the nature of the legal 
solution chosen for the inclusion of foreign companies 
in the Shtokman project. Total and StatoilHydro have 
not been awarded ownership of the ﬁ eld itself, but of 
parts of the company that will develop the ﬁ eld. Th is 
has resulted in a discussion about whether the two com-
panies can count Shtokman as part of their reserves. 
Th e diﬃ  culties of replacing reserves is the main driv-
er for Western companies to become involved in the 
Russian petroleum sector in spite of the diﬃ  culties al-
ready experienced by foreign companies in projects such 
as Sakhalin-II, Kovykta and Kharyaga. Th erefore Total 
and StatoilHydro are ﬁ ghting hard for Shtokman to 
be fully recognized as part of their reserves by inter-
national ﬁ nancial markets and on international stock 
exchanges.
Another important aspect of the deals that have 
been made is that they are more like options than own-
ership stakes. During the coming year or two Gazprom 
and the two foreign companies will attempt to hammer 
out the technical and ﬁ nancial details of the Shtokman 
project, which are far from clear at the moment. In 2009 
Total and StatoilHydro are to decide whether they want 
to make use of their right to a quarter each of the project 
under the conditions which they must negotiate with 
Gazprom. In spite of the symbolic and political weight 
of the project and its importance for international co-
operation and European energy security, this will ul-
timately have to be a business decision. It is worth re-
membering that perhaps the most disruptive point in 
the bumpy negotiations leading up to the decision to 
include Total and StatoilHydro was the distribution 
of the ﬁ nancial burden and risks between the Russian 
and Western sides. Th ere is no guarantee that Total and 
Statoil, as the company will then most likely have been 
renamed, will ﬁ nd the terms oﬀ ered suﬃ  ciently attrac-
tive when a decision is to be made in 2009.
Th e Importance of the Shtokman Field
Th e Shtokman ﬁ eld is now oﬃ  cially slated for produc-
tion in 2013, though few believe it will be possible to 
stay within this timeframe or even near it. Should the 
project nonetheless develop according to schedule, it 
would both be the biggest energy-related event and 
the most important international cooperation project 
in northern Europe in the decade 2010–2020. Th ere 
are several reasons for its importance:
(1) Th e Shtokman ﬁ eld theoretically contains 
enough gas to satisfy the entire consumption of the 
EU for seven years. In addition to Shtokman’s direct 
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importance for European energy supplies and securi-
ty, it is important for Europe because it includes the 
French oil company Total, and because it involves co-
operation between Europe’s biggest and third biggest 
external suppliers of natural gas – Russia and Norway 
(which jointly supply 65 per cent of EU imports). Russia 
and Norway are also respectively the world’s second 
and third biggest oil exporters, and from this perspec-
tive the cooperation is also an interesting development 
in the global petroleum sector. It should not, however, 
be interpreted as a precursor to a Russian-Norwegian 
led gas cartel, as all of Norway’s main political parties 
seem to be ﬁ rmly committed to avoiding the politici-
zation of Norwegian energy exports.
(2) Shtokman has widely been seen as driver of 
Russian–Norwegian cooperation across the border and 
of a joint Russian-Norwegian regional industrial boom 
in the High North, including northern Sweden and 
Finland. Expectations have run particularly high in 
northern Norway, where hopes for a petroleum boom 
with Shtokman at its centre have injected dynamism 
and optimism after decades of Cold War confrontation 
and unemployment in the ﬁ sheries. One of the most 
optimistic visions for the development of the region in-
cludes the so-called “Pomor Zone,” a joint Norwegian-
Russian industrial and economic cooperation zone 
straddling the border near Kirkenes. 
(3) Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the develop-
ment of the Shtokman ﬁ eld has occasionally been cast 
as a possible precursor to a solution of the Norwegian–
Russian border dispute in the Barents Sea. It is widely 
thought that the disputed area may include large petro-
leum resources, although the two parties have agreed 
to place a moratorium on exploration in the area. Due 
to the sensitivity of the topic, it is not possible to ac-
quire reliable oﬃ  cial information about the border ne-
gotiations, but several possible solutions have been dis-
cussed by people outside the negotiation process. One 
of these assumes that successful Norwegian-Russian co-
operation on Shtokman could provide a precedent for 
a solution of the border dispute involving extensive co-
operation in the formerly disputed area. According to 
this solution, the parties would ﬁ rst have to agree on 
a new borderline in the disputed area. Once the bor-
der were decided upon, the resources in the Norwegian 
part of the formerly disputed area could be owned 51 
percent by Norway, and 49 percent by Russia, where-
as those in the Russian part of the formerly disputed 
area could be owned 51 percent by Russia and 49 per-
cent by Norway. Obviously such a solution would re-
quire a high degree of cooperation and coordination be-
tween the two countries, which could – it is thought 
– be demonstrated through successful cooperation on 
Shtokman. Due to the closed nature of the negotiation 
process, it is not possible to ascertain whether such a 
solution is on the table. But the fact that it is discussed 
outside the negotiation process does say much about 
the importance for Norwegian-Russian cooperation 
ascribed to Shtokman.
(4) Developing the Shtokman ﬁ eld also involves 
making diﬃ  cult choices about the marketing and trans-
portation solution for the gas. Th e three main options 
are: (a) to build a liquefaction plant on the coast of the 
Kola Peninsula (most likely at the derelict ﬁ shing village 
of Teriberka) and export the gas as LNG by ship, (b) to 
build a pipeline from Murmansk to the Petersburg area 
and connect it to the Nord Stream pipeline going to 
Germany or (c) to lay a pipeline southwards through the 
Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and halfway down 
the Norwegian coast to connect with the Norwegian 
pipeline network. To some extent decision-making 
about Shtokman is thus also decision-making about 
whom Russia is going to trade and cooperate with inter-
nationally. Option (a) – exporting the Shtokman gas as 
LNG – is often thought of as synonymous with export-
ing it to the US, but the LNG could also be shipped to 
Europe. One of the advantages of an LNG solution is 
therefore that it gives some ﬂ exibility as far as the export 
market is concerned, although buyers would obviously 
need the appropriate terminals for receiving the LNG. 
So far it seems the preferred solution is (a) (LNG), lat-
er to be combined with (b) (a pipeline connection with 
Nord Stream). Solution (c) (connecting Shtokman with 
the Norwegian pipeline network) may be mostly wish-
ful Norwegian thinking. Although it could make sense 
in some practical respects, it is hardly a politically or 
economically attractive option for Russia.
Lessons Learned from the Shtokman 
Experience
Above all, the many phases of hope, ambition and dis-
appointment in Western attempts to become involved 
in Shtokman illustrate how Western actors often inten-
sively debate cooperation with Russia on the basis of 
all kinds of assumptions and expectations, without in 
fact engaging properly with signiﬁ cant Russian actors 
or being in touch with the reality on the Russian side. 
In this respect it is interesting to compare Shtokman 
with Norway’s Integrated Management Plan for the 
Barents Sea, which also involves great ambitions for in-
volving Russian actors in environmental processes and 
solutions that rest on uniquely Norwegian and Western 
perspectives and assumptions.
Th e oﬃ  cial reason most often mentioned by Russian 
actors for the initial decision to exclude all foreign ac-
tors from the Shtokman project was that none of the 
suitors made suﬃ  ciently attractive oﬀ ers. If one takes 
this argument seriously, the Shtokman case indicates 
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that ultimately ﬁ nancial considerations and proﬁ t may 
be the main driver in Russian energy cooperation with 
Western countries.
On the other hand, the politicization of the 
Shtokman negotiations, with multiple meetings be-
tween Russian and foreign politicians and high-lev-
el state functionaries, indicates that while business is 
important for the Russian side, business is controlled 
by politics. Western actors who want to cooperate will 
need the support of suﬃ  ciently strong politicians on 
the Russian side.
Th e development of the Shtokman ﬁ eld provides 
yet another illustration of the importance and sensi-
tivity of strategic resources to the Kremlin – which is 
determined to stay in control. Th ese Kremlin priorities 
are also mirrored in other developments in Russian-
Western energy cooperation, where Russia has been tak-
ing back control from Western companies that bought 
into Russian ﬁ elds in the 1990s. On the other hand, 
because the legal-institutional infrastructure for the 
Shtokman ﬁ eld is being developed under the full con-
trol of a sober Kremlin from the outset, cooperative re-
lations may prove more stable, and it will be more dif-
ﬁ cult for the Russian authorities to unilaterally blame 
problems on Western partners, though the pain of in-
dustrial delays and cost overruns may provide strong 
incentives to attempt to do so.
All discussion about Shtokman and other major pe-
troleum developments in the North is generally discon-
nected from the EU’s Northern Dimension, Barents 
cooperation, the Arctic Council and other multilater-
al frameworks for cooperation. One could get the im-
pression that cuddly multilateral cooperation is accept-
able, as long as it does not deal with the really big issues, 
which are handled in bilateral or narrow ad hoc multi-
lateral settings. Th is situation may in particular be due 
to Russian preferences and Russia’s image of itself on 
the international stage (not as one country among oth-
ers, but as an exceptional case) or to hardcore Russian 
realism in international relations. In that case it may be 
questionable whether the West in the short run can re-
ally lull Russia into full-hearted participation in a mul-
tilateral framework such as the Energy Dialogue, the 
Northern Dimension or other multilateral options that 
are available, while buying its resources at the bargain 
prices that importing countries expect. 
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Eastern Oildorado
East Siberia and the Far East have 13.5 percent of 
Russia’s total initial oil reserves and 19 percent of gas 
reserves. Resource estimates for East Siberia and the Far 
East vary between 15 billion and 22 billion tons of oil 
and 35 thousand cubic meters (tcm) and 61 tcm of gas. 
Th e lion’s share is located in remote Arctic regions and 
will not be in demand for 20-30 years. Russia’s east is 
poorly explored: the average density of drilling there is 2 
meters of deep wells per 1 sq km, while the Russian av-
erage is 23 meters per 1 sq km. Since all discoveries were 
made in the pre-1991 socialist era, modern prospecting 
technologies might identify many more reserves. For 
example, Petromir booked the major Angaro-Lensk gas 
ﬁ eld in the Irkutsk Region in 2007.
Production estimates vary enormously. Th e Energy 
Strategy of Russia up to 2020 forecasts 3 million tons/
year (mt/yr) of crude under a critical scenario by 2020, 
and 80 mt/yr under an optimistic scenario. Given their 
enormous range, these predictions seem closer to edu-
cated guesses than data-based conclusions.
Th is issue has political connotations, since compet-
ing governmental agencies oﬀ er diﬀ erent views. Th e 
Ministry of Natural Resources is optimistic, anticipat-
ing production of 30 mt/yr of oil and 50 bcm of gas in 
the nearest future, while railroad representatives doubt 
that crude output in East Siberia will increase from the 
current 0.5 to 30 mt by 2011. Th eir skepticism is deter-
mined by a desire to promote oil deliveries to China by 
rail rather than through new pipelines. 
Oil in East Siberia is sweet and light and could be 
sold at a higher price than the traditional Urals export 
blend. Additionally, major eastern gas ﬁ elds contain 
valuable products for the gas chemical industry. Despite 
these attractions, oil and gas exploration and produc-
tion in this greenﬁ eld province will be very expensive 
Analysis
All Quiet on the Eastern Front… 
By Nina Poussenkova, Moscow
Abstract
A priority of Russia’s energy policy is to diversify oil and gas exports, which are currently focused on the 
stagnating European markets, by entering the Asian energy market and accessing consumers as far away as 
the US. Since the ﬁ elds of West Siberia are all mature and declining, Russia needs to develop new oil and 
gas ﬁ elds in East Siberia and the Far East, which are located closer to potential customers in Asia. Th e im-
perative to “turn east” is also determined by Russia’s urge to revitalize its eastern territories and is thus in 
line with a broader national security agenda to develop a region which was long neglected. Geopolitically, 
Russia needs to build new relations with China, India and other countries of the Asia-Paciﬁ c region (APR). 
Th erefore, an eastern energy strategy will have to cope with a tangled web of economic, social, political and 
geopolitical considerations.
because of harsh climatic conditions, diﬃ  cult geology 
and lack of infrastructure. 
Russian academician Alexei Kontorovich from the 
Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
estimates that developing east Siberian oil will require 
an investment of $87 billion. When expenditures for 
creating social infrastructure and general-purpose in-
dustrial facilities are factored in, the sums become awe-
inspiring. Th e government intends to shift the ﬁ nan-
cial burden of creating the eastern petroleum industry 
onto the companies, and, despite the windfall oil reve-
nues that Russia enjoys today, its domestic funds might 
not be enough.
Th ough ﬁ nancially the eastern petroleum project 
seems too challenging, it is not a purely commercial 
endeavor since it has serious political implications. Th e 
problems that the region faces jeopardize Russia’s secu-
rity, and they stem both from the socialist legacy and 
the turbulent transition period. 
Territory of our Discontent
East Siberia and the Far East are plagued by econom-
ic and social problems, including slow growth, the ob-
solescence of ﬁ xed assets, a “colonial” type of develop-
ment, underinvestment in production facilities, an on-
going energy crisis, environmental degradation, gen-
eral poverty, a great social disparity among regions, a 
lack of transportation infrastructure, and the absence 
of trunk pipelines to move oil and gas. 
Demographic problems in the East threaten Russia’s 
national security. In 1989-2002, the population of the 
Far East declined by 16 percent, compared to 4 per-
cent for Russia as a whole. Th e average population den-
sity is 2.1 persons/sq. km in East Siberia and 1.1 in 
the Far East. Th ere is an acute shortage of manpower 
combined with illegal immigration from neighboring 
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countries. Th e situation particularly deteriorated after 
1991, when Moscow largely forgot about East Siberia 
and the Far East. 
 
All the King’s Horses, all the King’s Men…
Now Moscow is changing its attitude to its “eastern 
stepchild.” In 2006 President Vladimir Putin described 
the situation in the Far East as “a threat to national se-
curity” and stressed the need “to invest money in the Far 
East.” As a result, the federal government is now compil-
ing a targeted aid program entitled Th e Development of 
the Far East and the Trans-Baikal Region up to 2013. 
Th e Kremlin is taking practical steps to transform 
these backward territories. First, the government is com-
bining several of the regions in this part of Russia, cre-
ating fewer and larger entities, presumably to strength-
en Moscow’s control over them. 
Second, the Kremlin is using the power it took in 
2004 to appoint governors to carry out a major person-
nel reshuﬄ  e. Th e result is the appointment of a new 
regional leadership with either a St. Petersburg back-
ground or unquestioned loyalty to the Kremlin.
Th e third line of activities involves engaging big 
business in the solution of the region’s social and eco-
nomic problems through the fashionable use of public-
private partnerships. 
Simultaneously, the government is promoting oil 
and gas development in the East through ﬁ scal inno-
vations, as additional tax beneﬁ ts are required to attract 
investors. Changes in the Russian tax code concerning 
diﬀ erentiation of the mineral production tax are being 
considered, as well as tax holidays for greenﬁ eld territo-
ries, including in East Siberia and the Far East. 
 Also, eﬀ orts to modernize the Subsurface Law are 
underway; amendments to it are being dis-
cussed that are largely aimed at limiting the 
involvement of foreign majors in the devel-
opment of Russian strategic deposits.
All the eastern challenges are clearly re-
ﬂ ected in the problems of the East Siberia 
– Paciﬁ c Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, which 
should carry oil from East Siberia to the 
coast. Because this is a project where po-
litical considerations have so far prevailed 
over economic feasibility, ESPO is often 
compared to the Baikal-Amur Mainline 
(BAM), a gigantic railroad project that be-
came a stillborn child of socialism. Th e con-
struction of ESPO’s ﬁ rst stage will proba-
bly be delayed, mainly because the pipe-
line was rerouted by some 400 km north of 
Lake Baikal. Th e deadlines for the second 
stage have yet to be determined. According 
to Transneft, everything depends on how 
quickly the oilmen can explore and develop eastern 
oil ﬁ elds. 
Th e risk factors for ESPO are signiﬁ cant. Since the 
proved reserves of East Siberia are relatively small, no 
one knows the true size of the resource base in the re-
gion. Another problem is connected with ESPO’s com-
petition with the Russian Railways, an important trans-
porter of crude in Russia’s east. Some groups in the gov-
ernment wish to revitalize BAM, which can be used to 
transport oil.
Also, the price tag for the ﬁ rst stage of the project has 
already gone from $6.65 billion to $11 billion because 
of the longer path for the rerouted pipeline and high-
er costs. Th e greater outlays will result in higher tariﬀ s 
for transporting the oil, which raises questions about 
whether ESPO will be viable commercially. 
Who is the Mightiest of Th em All?
Until recently, state companies were poorly represent-
ed in the East, where private actors dominated the pe-
troleum landscape. Gazprom had no presence in the re-
gion, while Rosneft, though owning eastern assets, was 
too weak to be considered a serious player.
Th e desire of the Kremlin to control the strategic 
sectors of the economy will greatly aﬀ ect the develop-
ment of East Siberia’s resources. Th e government be-
lieves that the monumental task of revitalizing the re-
gion and forging energy ties with Asia can be entrust-
ed only to loyal companies. Th erefore, Moscow is cre-
ating conditions for displacing private actors in this ter-
ritory with state-owned corporations and for limiting 
the role of global majors. Figure 1 shows these chang-
es in graphic form.
Figure 1. Key Eastern Players, 2000 – 2007
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Gazprom
Russia’s natural gas monopoly is quickly founding its 
eastern empire. In 2005 it acquired Sibneft, which owns 
licenses on Sakhalin, Chukotka and in the Bering Sea. 
Its new subsidiary has 50 percent of Slavneft, which 
holds licenses in Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Gazprom hopes 
to acquire the other half of Slavneft, which currently 
belongs to TNK-BP. 
Gazprom made an important step forward by join-
ing Sakhalin-2 as a majority shareholder, and thus enter-
ing the LNG market. During the course of 2006 the au-
thorities threatened to shut Sakhalin Energy, the com-
pany running Sakhalin-2, because of alleged environ-
mental violations. Th ose problems ended in December 
2006 when Gazprom acquired 50 percent + 1 share in 
the company.
In 2007, Gazprom ﬁ nally gained control over 
Kovykta. Under pressure from Gazprom and the state 
authorities, who complained about license violations, 
TNK-BP agreed to sell its share of RUSIA Petroleum, 
which held the rights to develop Kovykta. (Now it seems 
that Gazprom would like to acquire a stake in TNK-BP 
itself, rather than simply take over this project).
With its purchase, Gazprom started preparing a new 
plan for developing Kovykta. Th is plan assumes that 
commercial production will begin in 2017 and the gas 
produced will be sold domestically to cover the poten-
tial shortage of blue fuel in Russia, though a certain pro-
portion will likely go to China. Presumably, Gazprom is 
not interested in commissioning Kovykta more quickly 
since the project could divert funds from higher priority 
plans to develop ﬁ elds on the Yamal Peninsula.
 Gazprom’s success in putting the ﬁ eld on stream 
will hinge primarily on the results of negotiations with 
China, the leading potential foreign market for Kovykta 
gas. Th ese talks are now deadlocked because the two 
sides cannot agree on a price. Gazprom claims this fail-
ure was caused by the generous terms of the previous 
ExxonMobil-China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) agreement on Sakhalin-1 gas deliveries. 
Gazprom has further ambitions: it has announced 
plans to acquire the Chayandinsk ﬁ eld in Yakutiya, 
with 1.24 tcm of gas reserves, and blocks of Sakhalin-3 
uncontested. Making these acquisitions will require 
changes in Russian legislation.
Gazprom’s role in the east is unique since in 2002 
the government appointed it coordinator of the state’s 
eastern gas policy and instructed it to develop the 
Eastern Gas Program. Th is work was completed only 
in 2007 after numerous revisions. Even the latest ver-
sion of the program contained 15 diﬀ erent scenari-
os for developing eastern hydrocarbon ﬁ elds through 
2030. Investments in the Eastern Gas Program to 
2030 would be $60.1 bln, and gas production is en-
visaged at 27 bcm/yr by 2010, and at 162 bcm/yr by 
2030.
Th e results of Gazprom’s initial ﬁ ve-year eﬀ ort leaves 
much to be desired. According to one government rep-
resentative, the versions of the program were selected 
“under conditions of equal economic ineﬃ  ciency.” It 
would probably be too optimistic to expect that this 
document will help achieve a real breakthrough in gas 
industry development in East Siberia.
 In 2006, Gazprom further entrenched itself in the 
region by signing a protocol with CNPC on deliveries 
of up to 80 bcm of gas starting in 2011. Consequently, 
Gazprom is developing the Altai pipeline project, which 
is designed to pump to China 30 bcm/yr of gas from 
the Nadym-Pur-Taz region, whose reserves may be in-
suﬃ  cient for this purpose. As a result, East Siberian gas 
might be needed to ﬁ ll the pipeline. 
Th rough its aggressive asset grabbing and the use 
of administrative resources, Gazprom turned from a 
virtual player with high authority, but no actual assets, 
into a formidable force in the region. 
Th e key question is: Can Gazprom provide enough 
gas to meet its commitments to Europe, satisfy the 
growing domestic demand, and supply China?
Rosneft
Rosneft is Russia’s state-owned oil national champi-
on. Having acquired the bulk of YUKOS’s oil assets, 
Rosneft was transformed from a minor player into the 
undisputed leader of the domestic oil industry. 
East Siberia and the Far East are the zone of 
Rosneft’s strategic interests. It has a strong presence 
in the Far East: its subsidiary Sakhalinmorneftegas 
is involved in the Sakhalin-1, -3, -4 and -5 projects. 
Sergei Bogdanchikov, Rosneft’s CEO, originally head-
ed Sakhalinmorneftegas, and this region is psycholog-
ically important to him.
In addition to Sakhalin, Rosneft established a foot-
hold in East Siberia. In 2003, it acquired Vankor in 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, defeating Total and YUKOS, com-
panies that both coveted the ﬁ eld. In 2005 Rosneft 
announced that Vankor’s recoverable reserves had in-
creased to 250 mt through additional exploration. 
In addition to expanding its reserve base, Rosneft 
fought for Vankor because it could not cede this ﬁ eld to 
a foreign major. Vankor is important since it represents 
a potential new channel of oil export not controlled by 
the state. Vankor oil can be shipped along the Northern 
Sea Route, bypassing Transneft’s bottlenecks, and di-
versifying markets. Also, sending the oil north would 
avoid mixing the high-quality Vankor crude with the 
lower quality Urals blend.
However, after studying several transportation op-
tions, Rosneft decided to pump the Vankor crude to 
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ESPO, because without Vankor it will be impossible 
to ﬁ ll the pipeline. Th us, the patronage of the Kremlin 
sometimes requires Rosneft to sacriﬁ ce proﬁ tability for 
political objectives. 
Filling the ESPO line has become an important 
priority for Rosneft. In 2005 the company further 
strengthened its eastern positions by buying 25.9 per-
cent of Verkhnechonskneftegas, license holder for the 
Verkhnechonsk ﬁ eld. Rosneft needs this oil for ESPO, 
which after its rerouting passes near Verkhnechonsk. In 
2007 it acquired eastern assets of YUKOS, including 
in the Yurubcheno-Tokhomsk Zone in Evenkiya, also 
a potential supplier of ESPO. 
Rosneft’s downstream positions in the East are strong 
and expanding: initially, it owned the Komsomolsk re-
ﬁ nery, two petroleum product distributors and three 
export terminals. Th en, Rosneft acquired all YUKOS 
reﬁ neries in 2007, including Angarsk and Achinsk in 
East Siberia, and its eastern fuel stations. Also, Rosneft 
intends to build a 20 mt/yr reﬁ nery at the end point 
of ESPO by 2012 – in line with Russia’s intentions of 
shifting from exports of crude to higher value-added 
products. 
Geopolitically, Rosneft now plays an important role 
in Russia’s relations with China, South Korea and India. 
Rosneft opened the door to Russian oil for the Chinese 
- in 2005, Rosneft invited Sinopec, with a 25.5 percent 
share, to conduct and co-ﬁ nance exploration of the 
Sakhalin-3 Veninsky block. Th en, in mid-2006, Vostok 
Energy JV was established between Rosneft (51%) and 
CNPC (49%) to work in Russia’s upstream market, and 
in 2007, it won an auction for two ﬁ elds in the Irkutsk 
Region, close to the ESPO route. Another Russian-
Chinese JV in China will deal with reﬁ ning and mar-
keting. 
Rosneft has a special relationship with China, as 
the Chinese banks provided $6 billion for Rosneft’s 
Yuganskneftegas acquisition. Chinese oil companies as-
pired to player status in Russia for many years, but their 
achievements were practically nil before the Yugansk 
deal, which changed their fortunes. 
Th e Chinese further strengthened ties with Rosneft 
by becoming its shareholders. Th eir successes may be at-
tributed to the socialist legacy of both countries, which 
makes it easier for the Chinese to understand the spe-
ciﬁ cs of doing business in Russia. Also, the Chinese 
not only try to access Russia’s upstream, but let Rosneft 
work in their downstream market as well.
South Korea is another country with which 
Rosneft does business by allowing the Korea National 
Oil Company (KNOC) to participate in the West 
Kamchatka shelf exploration on a 60%:40% basis. 
India, through its state-owned Oil and Natural Gas 
Company (ONGC), is also an important Rosneft part-
ner. Th eir cooperation started in 2001 on Sakhalin-1. 
Th en, in 2007, Rosneft and ONGC signed a memoran-
dum, under which the Indians would access Russian 
oﬀ shore ﬁ elds, in return, paying for their development 
and admitting Rosneft to the Indian downstream mar-
ket. 
Gazprom and Rosneft: Bitter Friends
In the past, Rosneft was too weak to compete with the 
almighty Gazprom. Recently, however, it has emerged 
as its rival on a variety of fronts – and is winning in 
many instances. 
Th is rivalry will probably intensify in the East. 
First, there might be further disputes about exports 
of Sakhalin-1 gas. Despite the credibility provided to 
Sakhalin-1 by Rosneft’s involvement, the project faces 
serious obstacles created by Gazprom’s desire to con-
trol its gas exports. Th erefore, when in 2006, Exxon 
Neftegas signed an agreement with CNPC to build a 
8 bcm/yr pipeline to China, Gazprom strongly resist-
ed the plan. 
In 2007, Gazprom demanded that Sakhalin-1 gas 
should be used to gasify eastern regions and not ex-
ported, though this PSA project can export gas inde-
pendently of Gazprom. Gazprom’s demand is not dic-
tated by its concern for the Russian regions, but its de-
sire to eliminate competition with ExxonMobil, since 
an agreement with the Sakhalin-1 shareholders per-
mits the Chinese to lower prices in negotiations with 
the concern.
Rivalry between Gazprom and Rosneft aggravates 
instability in the domestic oil and gas industry (and 
hinders development of Russia’s east). Nevertheless, the 
two competitors ensure a de facto system of checks 
and balances.
Since Gazprom and Rosneft have radically strength-
ened their positions in Russia’s east, it has become a 
testing ground for the new state petroleum policy. 
“Russiﬁ cation” and “etatization” of the domestic oil and 
gas sector will probably continue. Global majors will 
be delegated the role of junior partners: thus, Rosneft 
permitted BP to join Sakhalin-4 and Sakhalin-5 with 
49 percent. Up to now Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, both 
managed by foreigners, were the only eastern projects 
that showed real progress; and global majors remain the 
essential providers of technology and know-how. 
Private companies will be further displaced by 
Gazprom and Rosneft, probably not to the beneﬁ t of 
Russia’s East. Gazprom has its own corporate agenda 
that may diﬀ er from the national interests and hin-
ders the development of some eastern regions. Rosneft 
might be spread too thin after its recent acquisitions 
to undertake major projects. Also, the state commis-
sions them to perform additional social and politi-
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cal functions, which might further undermine their 
eﬃ  ciency.
***
In sum, the development of Russia’s East and eﬀ orts to 
work in the Asian energy markets face formidable chal-
lenges. Major breakthroughs in creating an eastern hy-
drocarbon province appear unlikely in the immediate 
future. Most likely, sporadic progress will be achieved 
in easier-to-implement projects where national objec-
tives coincide with the corporate interests of Gazprom 
and Rosneft. 
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Analysis
Regional Inﬂ uence in Oil and Gas Development: A Case Study of Sakhalin 
By Elana Wilson Rowe, Oslo
Abstract
Th e oﬀ shore oil and gas reserves oﬀ  Sakhalin Island in Russia’s Far East are one of Russia’s more promising 
locations for new ﬁ eld development and by 2010 Sakhalin’s oil production is expected to account for 7 per-
cent of the demand in the Asia-Paciﬁ c region. Not surprisingly, Sakhalin regional authorities seek to ensure a 
level of regional control over oﬀ shore oil and gas development, along with the corresponding economic ben-
eﬁ ts, despite a relatively weak position in light of Moscow’s eﬀ orts to centralize authority. Th is article exam-
ines ways in which regional administrations can and do inﬂ uence the process of oﬀ shore oil and gas devel-
opment in the Russian federation through a case study of the Sakhalin Oblast Administration. Regional au-
thorities on Sakhalin have managed to retain an inﬂ uential role for themselves via: 1) encouraging onshore 
infrastructure for oﬀ shore oil and gas operations; 2) working to smooth the way for development at the fed-
eral level; 3) insisting on local content and contracts when possible; and 4) ﬁ nding opportunities for region-
al and local beneﬁ t via impact assessment processes. Th is analysis is based on a review of publicly available 
primary sources (e.g. company documents) and interviews carried out with regional authorities and foreign 
executives in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in September 2006.
Changing the Federal-Regional 
Relationship
Th e early days of the post-Soviet period were marked 
by a pronounced decentralization, with many formerly 
centrally-held competencies being delegated to region-
al governments. Technically, sub-soil development was 
considered a shared federal-regional competency, with 
the federal government leading new initiatives and the 
regional government enjoying more involvement in pro-
posal approval and implementation. However, most re-
gional governments took a more pro-active role by es-
tablishing their own oil and gas concerns and taking 
an active and inﬂ uential interest in negotiating licens-
es and monitoring projects. 
Upon taking power at the end of 1999, President 
Vladimir Putin reversed the decentralization trend and 
replaced it with a policy to recentralize power and rev-
enue. In August 2004, the State Duma passed a re-
vised law on subsoil resources that eﬀ ectively returned 
their management to the federal government exclu-
sively. Th e recentralization of power helped the feder-
al government gain greater control over regional reve-
nues, including proﬁ ts from oil and gas development. 
While the regions used to retain 50 percent of tax reve-
nues, this balance has shifted in favor of Moscow, which 
then is to allocate revenues back to regional budgets. As 
becomes clear with the case of Sakhalin, much of the 
activity of the regional authorities is directed towards 
locating ways in which the revenues of oil and gas de-
velopment can, despite recentralization, be captured at 
the regional level.
Regional Interventions and the Ambiguities 
of Russian Federalism
Historically, Sakhalin Oblast authorities did not gain 
as much control as other resource-rich regions during 
the post-Soviet decentralization, as oﬀ shore oil and gas 
ﬁ elds fell clearly under federal jurisdiction. Regardless, 
regional authorities have been largely supportive of de-
velopment and can continue to be characterized as pro-
development. In fact, it was primarily regional voices 
(although still only a few) that publicly supported the 
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companies of the Sakhalin-2 consortium when the con-
sortium announced cost overruns that could delay the 
stage at which the Russian federal government would 
gain substantial revenue from the project as outlined in 
the relevant production sharing agreement (PSA). Th e 
cost overrun, in tandem with record-high oil prices, a 
general push for greater federal control of energy proj-
ects and dissatisfaction with PSAs, resulted in enough 
regulatory and political pressure being placed on the 
consortium to ensure that Gazprom became the con-
trolling shareholder. At a point where the tenor of the 
debate within Russia had become rather apocalyptic, 
Evgeny Galichanin, a member of the State Duma from 
Sakhalin and chairman of the Duma subcommittee 
on the oil industry stated, calmingly: “Th e situation 
must not be exaggerated and there must be no panic…
Sensational statements and threats to withdraw the li-
cense are unacceptable.”
Representing Sakhalin oil and gas interests at the 
federal level is perhaps the most important (and only) 
role that regional authorities have to play for projects 
in early licensing or exploration phases (such as the 
Sakhalin-3,4,5 and 6 projects). Th e regional govern-
ment had, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, been 
pro-active at the federal level in working to speed such 
nascent projects along, lobbying authorities in Moscow 
for improvements and clariﬁ cations to PSA legislation. 
Although it is now clear that Russia will not sign any 
further PSAs due to dissatisfaction with the existing 
PSAs concluded in a period of economic turmoil in 
Russia and low world oil prices, regional authorities 
continue to work in Moscow to facilitate further de-
velopment. As one oil executive put it in an interview 
with the author, “the regional government is our pri-
mary cheerleader because of the jobs and revenues that 
are evident at the local level.” Th is interviewee argued 
that regional authorities often work at the federal level 
to expedite Sakhalin-related issues. More room, how-
ever, for regional inﬂ uence opens up within advanced 
projects and a brief review of aspects of the Sakhalin-1 
and Sakhalin-2 projects illustrates ways in which this 
inﬂ uence is acquired and wielded.
Sakhalin-1
Sakhalin-1 consists of Exxon (30%); Japan Sakhalin Oil 
(30%); India’s ONGC (20%); Sakhalin Morneftegaz 
(11.5%) and RN-Astra (8.5%). A Sakhalin-1 PSA be-
came eﬀ ective in 1996, but the project developed slow-
ly until 2002. By 2006, Sakhalin-1 was one of the ﬁ ve 
biggest oil projects worldwide. 
Sakhalin’s regional leadership was reportedly un-
happy with the Sakhalin-1 consortium’s early decision 
to use primarily sea transport, as its aim had been to in-
volve both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 in order to spread 
the risk and investment needed to build an oil and gas 
pipeline along the length of the island. Exxon, the oper-
ating company for Sakhalin-1, balked at the cost of the 
pipeline. Some critical approvals were then delayed un-
til the Kremlin’s recentralization process greatly dimin-
ished regional authority and Exxon was able to pursue 
its preferred plans despite dissatisfaction at the region-
al level. Even though the regional authorities failed to 
realize their objective, this moment illustrates the over-
all desire of the regional government to bring oﬀ shore 
projects more “onshore” as soon as possible. Once proj-
ects are reliant on onshore infrastructure, there are more 
opportunities for local and regional inﬂ uence. While 
the Sakhalin Oblast administration and constituent 
municipal governments do not exercise control over 
the continental shelf, they do have signiﬁ cant author-
ity over important onshore elements, such as land and 
rights of way for onshore construction. 
One such example of onshore activity is an airport 
construction project in the northern town of Nogliki. 
Extensive upgrades of this local airport were carried out 
by Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 consortia working in tan-
dem and the airport opened with regional approval for 
public and company use in 2004. Th is airport is also an 
example of how ambiguity and uncertainty in the divi-
sion of competencies between the federal and regional 
levels can play an unpredictable role in the process of 
development – the airport was closed by federal author-
ities for general use in 2005 due to an alleged lack of 
necessary federal permits. Reportedly, an important el-
ement for re-opening the airport to the public was a let-
ter written by the president of Rosneft directly to Putin, 
who then ordered that the Nogliki Airport should be 
opened to commercial travel by June 2007.
Sakhalin-2
Sakhalin-2 – the largest integrated oil and gas proj-
ect in the world – is run by a consortium of corpora-
tions collectively called the Sakhalin Energy Investment 
Company (SEIC). Royal Dutch Shell was the majori-
ty partner until Gazprom gained a controlling share of 
the project as the result of a December 2006 deal. Th e 
Sakhalin-2 project illustrates: 1) ways in which region-
al authorities wield inﬂ uence when new infrastructure 
or impact assessments are needed and 2) how the fed-
eral-regional ﬁ scal relationship motivates the pursuit of 
such indirect power. 
In terms of infrastructure and assessment, the ﬁ rst 
phase of the project involved the installation of an oﬀ -
shore platform with no onshore construction beyond 
staﬀ  housing and oﬃ  ce space. With the commence-
ment of phase two in 2003, the inﬂ uence of the regional 
and municipal administrations increased as Sakhalin-2 
needed to move its primarily oﬀ shore activities onshore. 
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Phase two construction included a pipeline extending 
more than 600 kilometers down the length of the is-
land to a newly constructed LNG (liqueﬁ ed natural 
gas) plant and oil export facility at the southern end 
of Sakhalin. Phase two, according to a 2005 company 
document outlining public consultation plans, result-
ed in $300 million in infrastructure development on 
Sakhalin, including the construction of new bridges, 
upgrading of public roads and improvements to docks 
and railways. 
Th e expansion of onshore infrastructure opens an-
other window for regional inﬂ uence via the municipal 
level. In 2001, Putin proposed devolving more author-
ity to the municipal level, partly as a counterweight for 
recentralization. Th is proposition resulted in a 2003 
law “On Local Self-Government” outlining reforms 
that thus far remain largely unimplemented. Th e reform 
itself does not devolve speciﬁ c authority relating to sub-
surface resource development and it is notable that re-
gional governors and administrations, rather than mu-
nicipal representatives, were involved in the commis-
sion that developed the law. However, the clariﬁ cation 
of the land boundaries of municipalities may strengthen 
a card the municipal level already has to play – authori-
ty over land. As it stands now, oil and gas companies are 
frequently required to negotiate with municipal author-
ities when construction, such as a new pipeline, crosses 
municipal boundaries. Given the relatively low capaci-
ty of many municipal governments, it is likely that the 
regional administration intervenes in this supposedly 
municipal process and works to extract maximum ben-
eﬁ t, including additional desirable infrastructure and 
lease payments, from the relevant companies.
Phase two of the project also necessitated new 
rounds of consultation with local, regional and nation-
al stakeholders and environmental and social impact 
assessments. Th e impact assessment process is one in 
which regional law can be brought to bear in some ways. 
On the federal level, the SEIC impact assessment pro-
cess was subject to 22 federal laws, 13 regulations and 
procedures and 8 guidance documents. On the region-
al level, 11 regional laws ranging from town planning 
to endangered species to taxation and 10 gubernatorial 
decrees had to be taken into consideration as well. It is 
noteworthy, however, that a 2003 SEIC text outlining 
the company’s approach to environmental impact as-
sessment states clearly that the assessment is in keeping 
with federal law and considers regional law. Obviously, 
regional law remains of secondary legal importance in 
the assessment process.
Th e question of federal-regional revenue sharing 
and the dramatic changes introduced in this ﬁ eld dur-
ing the Putin presidency does much to explain why 
the regional level seeks to exert inﬂ uence and capture 
proﬁ t in the rather indirect ways described above. Th e 
Sakhalin-2 PSA illustrates this change vividly. Once 
Sakhalin Energy recovers the cost of its initial invest-
ment it will begin sharing proﬁ ts on a greater scale, as 
speciﬁ ed in its PSA, with the “Russian party.” When 
the Sakhalin-2 PSA was ﬁ rst set up, there was no clear 
line made between the federal and regional components 
of the “Russian party.” Subsidiary agreements clariﬁ ed 
that the oblast would receive 60 percent of proﬁ ts and 
the federal government 40 percent. Th e actual proﬁ t 
split between the regional and federal administrations, 
however, remains contingent on presidential decree and 
can be lawfully changed yearly or counteracted by new 
decrees. At present, and reﬂ ecting Putin’s recentraliza-
tion of authorities and revenues, the regional adminis-
tration now receives 5 percent of those revenues already 
generated today with 95 percent going to Moscow.
Th e contingency of regional proﬁ ts on federal deci-
sions creates problems for the Sakhalin Administration, 
as it cannot achieve the level of revenue certainty re-
quired to secure long-term loans independently for in-
frastructure development. One interviewee from within 
the oil sector with a long-term involvement on Sakhalin 
described this uncertainty as motivating the munici-
pal and regional levels to look for large-scale and con-
crete beneﬁ ts, such as school and hospital infrastructure, 
from oil companies in exchange for granting approvals 
and leases on land use. Th e administration also seeks 
other opportunities for regional economic development 
and beneﬁ t. For example, the Sakhalin-2 consortium 
paid $100 million into the Sakhalin Development Fund 
in the ﬁ ve years following the commencement of com-
mercial oil extraction. Th e oblast administration has 
also taken a keen interest in following how contracts 
are awarded and has promoted a “Sakhalin First” poli-
cy in relation to the award of tenders whenever this has 
been feasible, despite a lack of industrial capacity in the 
Russian Far East and the problem this poses to compa-
nies seeking to meet such local content requirements. 
Conclusions
Despite political and ﬁ scal centralization, Sakhalin au-
thorities continue to exert indirect, albeit greatly re-
duced, inﬂ uence over the process of oil and gas devel-
opment. Regional authorities have endeavored to expe-
dite project development to the point where onshore in-
frastructure is both necessary and desirable. When oﬀ -
shore development requires onshore access, oil and gas 
exploitation becomes more directly proﬁ table to, and 
controllable by, the region itself and the opportunities 
for capturing economic beneﬁ ts at the regional level 
increase. Th is facilitating and expediting role is exem-
pliﬁ ed by regional authorities using their contacts in 
Moscow to intervene at the federal level on behalf of 
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oil and gas consortiums active in Sakhalin and lobby-
ing for expedited award of PSAs and stable PSA legisla-
tion, when these agreements still seemed like a feasible 
alternative for moving development forward. 
However, local authorities have not refrained from 
intervening and sometimes slowing projects’ develop-
ment in order to increase regional involvement/control 
and potential regional beneﬁ ts. For example, Sakhalin 
Oblast has lobbied for local awards of contracts when-
ever possible, forwarding a “Sakhalin-ﬁ rst” policy, and 
successfully ensured that payments to the Sakhalin 
Development Fund were included in Sakhalin-1 and 
-2’s PSAs. Th is points to ways in which regional author-
ities are vigilant in holding oil and gas consortiums to 
the requirements of their contracts, particularly when 
these requirements result in direct beneﬁ t at the local 
and regional levels. Regional authorities also seem to 
be able to exercise some authority over the impact as-
sessment process – an undertaking that certainly re-
quires their knowledge of the local political and social 
environment.
Although the authority of the region is doubtlessly 
diminished, the ability of regional administrations to 
act as “cheerleaders” or “brakes” should not be under-
estimated. Th us it seems that although regional govern-
ments no longer possess the authority they once had, the 
complex and detailed processes entailed in oil and gas 
development necessitate good relationships on all levels 
of government. Th e regional level, in this way, retains 
residual power and also actively works to build up both 
formal and informal authority in new capacities.
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